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I. INTRODUCTION 
Physicians with admitting privileges at hospitals are traditionally considered 
independent contractors and not hospital employees. The classification of admitting 
physicians as independent contractors is important because the benefits and protections 
afforded by most labor and employment laws apply only to employees. Yet these laws 
tend to provide little guidance as to who qualifies as an employee. 1 Moreover, the 
courts have failed to articulate a consistent test for distinguishing between employees 
and independent contractors.2 This mixed body oflaw has resulted in courts frequently 
dismissing challenges brought by admitting physicians against hospitals under labor and 
employment laws because the physicians were not deemed employees. 
In Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hospital, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit (Second Circuit) challenged the long-held assumption that admitting physicians 
are independent contractors for purposes ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII), which prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, race, color, national 
origin, and religion. 3 Relying on the common-law agency test for distinguishing between 
employees and independent contractors, the Second Circuit found that a question of fact 
existed as to whether the admitting physician was an employee of the hospital due to the 
level of control that the hospital exercised on the physician's medical practice through 
hospital standards, supervision, and corrective action. 
Salamon is the most recent case to analyze the worker classification of admitting 
physicians for purposes of Title VII. In Salamon, the Second Circuit addressed the 
difficulties of applying the common-law agency test in the medical context and provided 
an innovative framework for analyzing the physician-hospital relationship that focuses 
on the level of control the hospital exercises on the physician's practice. This Article 
argues that the Second Circuit's framework is superior to the approach that other circuits 
have endorsed for determining the worker classification of physicians and is consistent 
with the development of the physician-hospital relationship. 
1 See Civil Act of 1964, Title VII§ 701, 42 U.S.C. § (2012) (defining an 
U.S.C. § 203(e)(l) (2012) 
see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
means any individual an employer); 
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012) (ex1Jres:smg 
that "employee" means any individual an employer); see also Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012) (articulating that "employee" means any individual employed 
an employer); see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) (referring 
to an as an individual employed an see also Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § (2012) (defining "employee" as an individual employed by any 
employer). 
2 See Patricia Davidson, Comment, The Under Title VII: 
Between l!lnployees Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 203, 204-19 (1984) 
how courts employ three different tests for between and 
independent contractors: ( 1) the common-law agency test, (2) the economic realities test, and (3) a 
hybrid test that combines elements of both the common-law agency test and the economic realities 
test). 
3 See Salamon v. Om Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 228-29 Cir. 2008). 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
A. Hospitals as Workshops for Independent Physicians 
a. The Reconceptualization of the Hospital in the Early 1900s 
Physicians have traditionally been independent ofhospitals.4 For most of the nineteenth 
century, hospitals were primarily religious and charitable institutions for tending the sick, 
rather than medical institutions intended to cure.5 Hospitals evolved from almshouses 
and other unspecialized institutions that served welfare functions for the elderly and 
mentally ill.6 Even as hospitals began treating the sick, they limited their services to 
low-income patients.7 As a result, physicians performed most services for middle and 
upper class patients outside ofhospitals. 8 
Between 1900 and 1910, hospitals moved to the center of medical practice due to 
advances in science and technology. Control over infections and improvements in 
diagnostic tools allowed surgeons to operate earlier.9 As surgery became safer and more 
common, physicians became dependent on the diagnostic and therapeutic facilities 
hospitals could provide. 10 Hospitals began to charge for their care and permitted 
physicians practicing in their facilities to charge for their services. 11 As the demand for 
hospital services increased, the number of hospitals increased from 178 in 1873 to 4,349 
in 1909.12 With these changes, the concept of the hospital evolved from "refuges for the 
homeless poor ... into doctors' workshops for all types and classes ofpatients."13 
b. Physician Dominance Over the Medical Practice and Its Workplace 
The conceptualization of the hospital as a workshop that makes its facilities and 
equipment available to independent physicians brought important changes to its internal 
4 See Robert A. Berenson et al., Relations: 
0e11ararnm1 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS w3 l, w3 l (2007) ("Physicians 
m"'"'",,,,1,,.n1 of hospitals and have used them as in which to carry out their services."). 
5 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145 (1949). 
6 Id. at 149. 
Id. at 150. 
8 See id. at 157; see also Morris J. Vogel, The 1850-1920, 
in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL HISTORY 105, 105-06 (1979) (noting that during the 
nineteenth century "even the most difficult 
9 See Starr, supra note 5, at 156. 
w Id. 
procedures were performed in the home"). 
11 See id. at 163 (noting that while "no American hospital permitted fees" in 1880, "the widely 
resented rule forbidding physicians to take fees from private patients ... began to die out at the turn 
of the century."). 
12 See Timothy Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation 
Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 846 (1983) ~nirmma the increase in the 
number of hospitals). 
13 See Starr, supra note 5, at 146 that with medical advances, "the conscientious 
nm•01 r·10n became increasingly dependent on the and therapeutic facilities which only a 
could provide."). 
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organization and authority distribution. Early hospitals were largely operated by hospital-
based staff. 14 Since hospitals relied on charity, trustees decided which physicians were 
granted privileges, which services were provided, and which patients were admitted. 15 
As hospitals came to rely on payments from the patients of physicians, independent 
physicians replaced the trustees as the chief source of income for hospitals and gained 
authority over the services available and the patients admitted. 16 
Between 1900 and 1917, physicians enjoyed unfettered control over the medical practice 
and its workplace. 17 Hospitals exercised no control over the work of physicians and 
were largely insulated from associated liability. 18 As charitable institutions, hospitals 
were protected from liability for the tortious conduct of physicians by the doctrine of 
charitable immunity. 19 In 1914, Judge Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York 
Court of Appeals, held in Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y Hospital that a hospital was 
not liable for the tortious conduct of independent physicians. 20 Schloendorff concerned 
an action against a charitable hospital for an unauthorized surgery.21 Judge Cardozo 
concluded that the wrong was that of the physicians who were pursuing an independent 
calling and not the hospital.22 Judge Cardozo reasoned that the hospital did not intend to 
act through physicians, but rather for the physicians to act on their own responsibility.23 
B. Quality of Care and Medical Staff Oversight of Physicians 
a. The Development of Minimum Standards for Hospitals 
As a growing number of physicians gained admitting privileges at hospitals, questions 
emerged regarding the quality of patient care.24 Surgeons generally believed that 
hospitals and physicians should meet minimum requirements to ensure quality of care. 25 
14 Id. at 149. 
ls Id. 
16 See id. at 162 relied on donations, the trustees were vitaL But as hospitals came 
to rely on receipts from patients, the doctors who brought in the patients became more "). 
17 See Mark Hall, Institutional Control Behavior: to Health Care Cost 
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 445 (1988). 
18 See MILTON ROEMER & JAY FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL S1AFF ORGANIZATION AND 
HosPrrAL PERFORMANCE 34 ( 1971) was no systematic policy in voluntary hospitals toward 
exercise of controls over the work of private physicians."). 
19 See McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 436 (1876); see also SARA 
ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERJCAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 789, 790(2012) (explaining that 
"[t]he remarkable about the charitable immunity doctrine was not that it existed in 1876, but 
that it continued to exist into the 1950s and 1960s, long after hospitals had transformed themselves 
into large economic entities serving paying and low-income patients."). 
20 See Schloendorffv. Soc'y of NY Hospital, 211 NY 125, 130 (1914). 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 131 that "the wrong was not that of the hospital; it was that who 
were not the [hospital's] servants, but were pursuing an independent calling."). 
23 Id. 
24 See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALIH CARE SYSTEM 789, 792(2012). 
25 See id. (explaining that surgeons for the standardization of hospitals in part because a 
"wide-open hospital threatened the economic interests and professional status of surgeons."). 
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In 1917, the American College of Surgeons (ACS) developed minimum standards for 
hospitals and a Hospital Standardization Program (HSP) to monitor compliance. 26 These 
standards were meant to organize hospital facilities and clarify the roles of hospitals and 
physicians in maintaining quality of care.27 The HSP was the predecessor of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).28 
Adherence to the ACS standards was voluntary and compliance was widely resisted.29 
However, compliance with these standards became a requirement for participation in 
private and public licensing, certification, and financing programs.30 States modeled 
their licensure statutes after the ACS standards and backed them with enforcement 
authority.31 The Medicare program relied on the ACS standards to certify hospitals for 
participation in the program.32 In addition, some health plans required compliance with 
the standards as a condition of participation. 33 
b. Medical Staff Oversight of Physicians 
The ACS standards solidified the modern organizational structure of a hospital consisting 
of the governing body, administrative staff, and medical staff.34 The standards provided 
for the self-regulation of physicians through an organized medical staff charged with 
adopting, with the consent of the hospital's governing body, medical staff bylaws.35 
The bylaws set the organization of the medical staff, defined its relationship with the 
hospital, and delineated the procedures by which staff privileges would be granted and 
corrective actions taken against physicians.36 
The legal status of the medical staff quickly became subject to debate. Following the 
characterization of the medical staff as a self-governing body consisting of independent 
physicians, some courts recognized the medical staff as a legal entity separate from 
26 Id. at 793. 
27 Id 
2s Id. 
29 See id. at 793 ("[Cjompliance [to the standards] was resisted, not the less elite 
general but also most physicians who wanted to avoid bitter mt1·a-r1rnless:mnlal 
");see also LOYAL DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
SuRGEONS 230 (1981) the to the ACS standards the American Medical 
30 and 
31 See Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 793 (explaining that states relied on the ACS standards to draft 
Ji censure statutes). 
32 See, e.g. 42 C.FR. § 482.22 ("The hospital must have an medical staff that operates 
under the and which is responsible for the quality of medical 
care."). 






that accreditation is a condition of participation for Blue 
A1inimum and 
Services, 141 ARCH. PArnOL. LAB. MED. 704, 708 (2017). 
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the hospital.37 However, most courts have declined to recognize the medical staff as a 
distinct entity, noting that "[the medical staff] has no legal life of its own and is merely 
one component of the hospital."38 Courts have reasoned that the governing body must 
delegate certain authority for the medical staff to exercise self-determination due to state 
laws barring the corporate practice of medicine. 39 
c. The Decline of the Traditional Physician-Hospital Relationship 
Hospital regulation and medical staff oversight of physicians during this period 
challenged the initial conceptualization of the hospital as a workshop of independent 
physicians. The medical staff was a membership in a self-governing organization that 
afforded physicians rights and responsibilities. Hospitals provided equipment and 
staff that enabled physicians to provide medical services that they could not provide 
elsewhere.40 In exchange, physicians served on quality and utilization review committees 
and undertook Emergency Department on-call responsibilities.41 
However, as a new vision of the hospital emerged as a provider of medical care, the 
idea of the hospital as a "passive charity removed from operational responsibility" 
faded away.42 This shift coincided with court rulings abandoning the doctrines that 
once protected hospitals from tort liability. In 1957, Judge William Fuld overruled the 
doctrine of charitable immunity as applied to hospitals, as well as Judge Cardozo's 
ruling in Schloendorff.43 In Schloendorff. which involved an action against a hospital 
for injuries caused by some of its nurses, Judge Fuld held that "[t]he conception that 
the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through 
its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon 
their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact."44 Judge Fuld noted that hospitals 
currently provide more than facilities for treatment, which is demonstrated in how 
hospitals operate.45 
37 See SL John's Hosp. Med. Staffv: St. John Med. Ctr, 245 N.W.2d 472, 473 (S.D. 1976) 
1 u.'"''"uurnrni; the medical staff to be an association 
also Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 539 (N.J 1975) 
an association). 
38 See Exeter Hosp. Med. Staffv. Board of Tr. of Exeter Health Res., Inc., 810 A2d 53, 56 (N.H. 
2002); see also Ramey v. Hosp. Auth. of Habersham Cty., 462 S.E.2d 787, 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1995) that the medical staff is not a separate, capable sued 
independently of the hospital 
'-~urn1Jtug.nillu, Comment, The 
,_,,.,,,,<,,.,,,," 50 WASH. L REv. 385, 392 (1975) (noting that most state medical 
practices acts would be violated hospital administrators' attempts to exercise control over medical 
treatment); see also Brown v. SL Vincent's Hosp., 222 AD. 402, 404 (NY App. Div. 1928) 
that a "hospital corporation may not ... interfere with the method of treatment"). 
40 See Berenson, supra note 4, at w31. 
41 Id 
42 See Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 794. 
43 See v. 143 N.E.2d. 3, 9 (NY 1957). 
44 Id at 8. 
4s Id 
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This shift was consistent with a growing recognition by the courts that hospitals have 
direct duties to patients regarding quality of care.46 In Darling v. Charleston Community 
Memorial Hospital, where injuries resulted from a hospital's failure to supervise the 
care provided at its facilities, the Illinois Supreme Court held that hospitals have 
direct corporate responsibility for the supervision of care.47 Following Darling, courts 
have recognized a duty to screen out incompetent physicians and other providers at 
the time of initial appointment or reappointment to the medical staff.48 In Johnson v. 
Misericordia Community Hospital, which involved a medical procedure that was not 
performed in accord with standard medical practice, the court held a hospital liable 
for failing to check with previous hospitals where the physician's privileges had been 
revoked.49 Hospitals have also been held liable for failing to monitor the performance of 
physicians and terminate physicians with a record of mistakes involving patient care.so 
C. Managed Care and Institutional Control Over Physicians 
a. The Need to Control Health Care Costs 
As hospitals gained greater responsibility over quality of care, greater pressure to 
contain health care costs ensued. Throughout most of the twentieth century, hospitals 
and physicians were paid a fee for each service they provided.s 1 Patients paid out-of-
pocket for the services they received.s2 However, a new system of third-party payment 
emerged with the rise of health insurance coverage and the creation of Medicare. Health 
insurers and Medicare paid hospitals and physicians based on the cost of each service 
provided and the prevailing fee in their geographic area.s3 These payment mechanisms 
insulated hospitals and physicians from the cost of medical care and created incentives 
to maximize the volume of services to receive higher payments.s4 
fO lC<'l!UtUlt; 
14 PAC. L.J. 55, 77 (1982) (describing the of 
Memorial 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill. 1965) 
of care by failing to respond to apparent errors physicians as 
48 See, e.g., Johnson v: Misericordia Colllll:mrnty nu>µ1cm, 301 N.W2d 156, 174 
49 Id. 
1981). 
so See Elam v. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161 Ct. App. 1982) (embracing that 
the hospital breached duty of care failing to monitor the performance of physician); see also 
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 537-38 (N.J. 1975) (noting that breached 
duty of care failing to terminate doctor with a record of mistakes). 
51 See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, New Legal Doctrine in Care: 
A Model to Industrial 32 U. MrCH. J.L. REFORM 813, 839 (1999). 
s2 Id. 
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The 1970s opened with a crisis in health care.55 By 1980, health care expenditures had 
reached $230 billion, up from $69 billion in 1970.56 As pressure to contain health care 
expenditures increased, third-party payers began to experiment with payment methods 
that moved away from the traditional fee-for-service system. In 1983, Medicare adopted 
the diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system for hospitals, under which hospitals 
received a fixed amount per patient based on the patient's diagnosis rather than an 
amount based on the actual treatment costs incurred. 57 Other payers, including states and 
self-insured employers, began to steer patients into Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs), which functioned as an alternative to health insurance plans.58 Like the DRG 
system, HMOs provided patient care for a fixed per capita fee. 59 
b. Institutional Control Over Physicians 
Up to eighty percent of health care costs are within the control of physicians.60 Even 
though prospective payment systems did not target physicians directly, the ability 
of hospitals and HMOs to control health care costs depended on the ability to exert 
institutional control over physicians, whose practices had been largely unregulated. 
In designing the DRG payment system, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services recognized that "prospective payment ... provides a number of ... desired 
incentives by inducing hospitals to control physician services which have associated 
hospital costs."61 Similarly, the purpose ofHMOs was to manage costs by working with 
physicians to provide only medically necessary and cost effective medical services.62 
Accordingly, hospitals and HMOs adopted different strategies to influence 
physician behavior and reduce medical expenditures. Hospitals and HMOs adopted 
preauthorization review protocols for ordering certain medications and performing 
certain procedures.63 In an effort to control costs, hospitals adopted rigid standardized 
treatment protocols aimed at decreasing length of stay or the number of medical 
55 Id at 381. 
56 Id. at 380. 
57 See Stuart Altman, The Lessons Prospective Payment Show That The 
nmtPl1UP.'' 31HEALrHAFFAIRS1923, 1924-25 (2012). 
58 See Donna Horoshack et al., State 
HEALTH CARE 765, 767 (Peter R. Krnm1'1v1ent 
lVlllnUJ<ea Care, in ESSENTIALS OF lvlANAGED 
59 See Peter D. Fox et al., The Care, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH 
CARE 3, 6 (Peter R. 
rm;s"·wn Utilization, 23 MED. CARE 461 (1985); see also John 
Williams, Cost Containment and 'Practice 
Behavior, 246 JAMA 2195 (1981) (noting that between 50 and 80 percent of health care costs are 
controlled 
6I See US. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., PAYING PHYSICIANS: CHOICE FOR MEDICARE E-8 (1988). 
62 See Peter R. Kongstvedt, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALrn CARE 6 (2007) that the cost 
contaimnent and assessment policies health maintenance rnJSarn.~auvuo 
control the mapp1ropna·teuse of medical services). 
63 '-"''""'u'"'.!S· DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE 130 (1986); see also 
l:\1sent•erg & Williams, supra note 60, at 2198 (describing review by uu:>~rnw.l>J. 
9 
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procedures and diagnostic tests prescribed. 64 Enforcement of these directives varied 
from barring physicians from using facilities to refusing to pay for unapproved 
treatment. 65 Physician education and feedback from peer review were used to influence 
physician behavior and control expenditures. 
Hospitals and HMOs relied on institutional inducements in the form of sanctions for 
excessive treatment and rewards for conservative treatment. The Independent Practice 
Associations, which compensated physicians on a discounted fee-for-service basis, 
provided bonuses for efficient performance or reduced payment for inefficiency.66 
Some hospitals paid their medical staff a percentage of profits earned from Medicare 
patients.67 Other hospitals rewarded profitable physicians with in-kind or fringe benefits, 
such as office space, secretarial services, and malpractice insurance.68 These strategies 
raised concerns regarding federal and state prohibitions on financial dealings between 
physicians and the hospitals to which they refer patients.69 
c. The Beginning of New Physician-Hospital Relationships 
Managed care drastically changed the nature of the relationship between physicians 
and hospitals by bringing changes in both reimbursement and contracting for hospital 
services.70 Throughout most of the twentieth century, the economic incentives of 
physicians and hospitals were aligned and higher reimbursements were associated with 
providing more services.71 Prospective payment mechanisms altered this relationship. 
Because hospitals were paid a fixed sum per patient, administrators were no longer 
indifferent to resources physicians expended in treatment. 72 Physicians were incentivized 
to provide more services to receive higher payment.73 
64 See Hall, supra note 17, at 449-50 (describing treatment protocols); see also William A. 
Chittenden III, Care: History and Prognosis, 26 Trnu & INS. 
L.J. 451, 456 n.28 (1991) (describing standardized and treatment protocols by HMOs). 
65 See Hall, supra note 17, at 463-64 (describing enforcement mechanisms with standardized 
66 Id. at 484. 
67 See id. at 486 (noting, by way of example, that the Paracelsus chain of hospitals in California 
each member of the medical staff a percentage of the profits the hospital earned from that 
Medicare patients). 
68 See COMM. ON IMPL!CATIONS OF FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALm CARE, INST. OF MED., FoR-
PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 166 n.7 (1986) different in-kind and fringe"'"'"""'" 
benefits). 
69 See Hall, supra note 17, at 487-88 (providing an overview of federal and state fee 
prohibitions). 
70 See Alison E. Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, Integration 
J. HEALTH EcoN. 1, 3 (2006) (reasoning that "[m]anaged care brought about a 
25 
contracting and reimbursement"). 
71 See Starr, supra note 5, at 385 under fee- for-service, doctors and hospitals make more 
money the more services they provide, they have an incentive to maximize the volmne of services."). 
72 See Eisenberg & Williams, supra note 60, at 2198 (describing hospital cost-containment 
73 Id. 
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At the same time, managed care brought changes in contracting for hospital services. 
Because HMOs provided care on a capitated basis, HMOs selectively contracted with 
hospitals to negotiate lower prices and shift payment risk to hospitals.74 Hospitals faced 
pressure to lower costs and gain bargaining power to improve their competitive position 
for managed care contracts.75 In response, hospitals sought more strategic relationships 
with physicians by acquiring physician practices, including primary care physicians, and 
employing the physicians.76 By 1998, more than 66 percent of hospitals were integrated 
with a physician practice, up from 3 3 percent in 1993. 77 
Physician integration with employed physicians was intended to help hospitals lower 
costs and gain bargaining power. The expectation was that employed physicians would 
be more cooperative with hospital administration to manage costs and secure more 
hospital admissions.78 Moreover, employing physicians allowed hospitals to negotiate 
jointly with HM Os. Due to the risk that failure to reach an agreement would result in the 
loss of both the hospitals and physicians, employing physicians helped hospitals gain 
bargaining power.79 For physicians, hospital employment provided a "shelter from an 
increasingly complex and unstable market."80 
D. Increasing Competition, Quality Expectations, and Physician Employment 
a. Physician-Hospital Competition Over Services 
Hospitals were under economic pressure to affiliate with physicians, and an adversarial 
climate with physician-owned facilities ensued. Technological advances enabled more 
affordable equipment and hospital services to be performed in ambulatory settings. 
Physicians began to acquire equipment and ambulatory surgical centers, which made 
physicians direct competitors with hospitals. 81 By owning these facilities, physicians 
74 See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 70, at 3. 
75 Id 
76 See Lawton R. Bums et aL, Impact A1arket Structure on rn•cw11;za11-n 
Alliance, 35 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 101, 104 (2000). 
77 See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 70, at 2 (noting that 
i.e., areas with high managed care penetration rates, are more likely to have ve1iical relationships 
with physicians than hospitals in low-managed care areas; only 29 percent of hospitals in low-
managed care areas had ve1iical relationships in 1998, compared to 70 percent of hospitals in high-
managed care areas."). 
78 See id. at 3-4 (arguing that physician integration increases efficiency and quality by allmving 
physicians and hospitals to achieve economies of scale); see also Lawrence Casalino & James 
C. Robinson, Alternative Models as the United States Moves 
Mc.ma;r;ea Care, 81 THE MILBANK Q. 331, 338 (2003) (noting that hospitals that 
employ are more to compel cooperation through managerial authority and secure 
admissions than those with staff physicians). 
79 See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 70, at 5-6 (observing different theories which 
nh''0"'""n integration may be used to increase hospital market power and bargaining power with 
health plans). 
80 See Lm11Tence P Casalino et al., Relations: Two-Tracks and the Decline 
the 27 HEALrn AFFAIRS 1305, 1309 (2008) physician 
motivations for integrating with hospitals). 
81 See Berenson, supra note 4, at w35-w36. 
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were able to capture the facility fee associated with these services that would otherwise 
go to the hospital, increase consumer expectation of a "one-stop shop" for medical 
services, and control their work hours and environment. 82 
b. Patient Safety and Quality of Care Expectations 
Hospitals also experienced increasing pressure to improve patient safety and quality of 
care. In 1999, the Institute of Medicine issued its landmark report, "To Err is Human," 
which estimated that as many as 98,000 patients die annually in U.S. hospitals due to 
preventable medical errors. 83 The report put health care quality in the sight of public 
and private payers, leading to a number of initiatives aimed at improving patient safety 
and quality of care. One of these initiatives was the publication of comparative quality 
information. In 2001, the Medicare program launched the Hospital Quality Initiative.84 
Although participation was voluntary, hospitals participated to receive a payment 
update. 85 In 2002, JCAH began requiring hospital quality performance reporting. 86 
"Pay-for-performance" programs, an influential initiative, generally imposed financial 
penalties on health care providers that failed to meet quality or performance measures. 87 
These measures included process measures that focused on specific activities that 
contribute to positive health outcomes, the effect of care on patients, and patient 
satisfaction with the care they received at the hospital. 88 The Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing Program was another initiative where hospitals were paid on the basis of 
quality measures and performance improvements. 89 
c. The Rise of Physician Employment and its Impact on Admitting Physicians 
In response to the increasingly adversarial environment with physician-owned facilities 
and new pressure to improve patient safety and quality of care, hospitals explored 
82 See Casalino, supra note 78, at 1310 (explaining that ownership of these facilities enables 
physicians to focus on a more narrow range of procedures, which facilitates efficient scheduling 
and allows for profitability); see also Berenson, supra note 4, at w34 (noting that motivating factors 
included "seeking additional sources of income, increasing consumers' of 'one-stop 
shopping' for services, and growing physician demand for control over their own work 
environment"). 
83 See INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HuMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (2000), 
nap.edu/catalog/9728/to-err-is-human-building-a-safer-health-system. 
84 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAJD SERVS., HOSPITAL QUALITY INITIATIVE OVERVIEW 1 (2005), 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 See JOINT COMMISSION ON AcCREDITA:rlON OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, ONGOING Acnvnrns: 2000 
TO 2004 STANDARDIZATION OF METRICS, https://w\;vw.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SIWG_ Vision_ 
87 See Julia James, Health 
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb2012101 l .90233/fu11/. 
88 Id. at 2. 
HEALTHAFFAJRS (2012), https://www. 
89 See id. at 3; see also Cms. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAJD SERVS., HosrrrAL VALUE-BASED 
PURCHASING 1, 3 (2017), https:/ /www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_ VBPurchasing_Facl_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf. 
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new relationships with physicians through two main strategies: joint venturing and 
physician employment. 90 
Hospitals that enter into joint-venture arrangements generally expect to retain some 
of the revenue the hospital would have otherwise lost to a competing physician-owned 
entity. 91 For physicians, entering into a joint venture with hospitals allows them to benefit 
from hospital capital and the hospital's management.92 However, since many joint 
ventures occur between not-for-profit hospitals and for-profit physician entities, such 
arrangements raise concern regarding Internal Revenue Service rules on tax-exempt 
status. 93 Due to the possibility of service referrals, these joint venture arrangements also 
raise concern regarding the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which generally prohibits 
payment for referral of Medicaid or Medicare business.94 
Given the regulatory obstacles to establishing joint ventures, hospitals moved to a 
physician employment model that was focused on employing specialists. Building on 
earlier trends of employing primary care physicians, the employment of specialists 
allowed hospitals to preempt competition from physician-owned facilities and increase 
negotiating leverage with health plans. 95 Hospitals also employed physicians to staff 
Emergency Departrnents.96 For years, hospitals reported the unwillingness of medical 
staff to cover the Emergency Department, which forced hospitals to pay generous per 
di ems for physicians to assume on-call responsibilities. 97 
The employment of specialists threatened hospital relationships with their medical 
staff. Hospitals have isolated admitting physicians who are members of their medical 
staff by emphasizing service lines that feature employed specialists.98 Although certain 
hospitals have branded their service lines with participation of employed specialists and 
medical staff, many have excluded the medical staff to have greater control over how 
services are provided and marketed.99 
With the rise in physician employment and its impact on medical staff physicians, the 
definition of the hospital-physician relationship is underscored.100 Pressure from third-
party payers to control health care costs and improve patient safety urges hospitals to 
91 See Berenson, supra note 4, at w38 
ventures). 
ventures and 
New: Recent Developments in nn"'""n-
471, 479 (2003) 
93 See Berenson, supra note 4, at w39 
94 Id 
95 See Casalino, supra note 77, at 1308 
96 Id 
97 Id 
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reassess their relationship with employed physicians and admitting physicians, such as 
the level of control the hospital wishes to exercise over physician behavior. 101 Although 
hospitals may exercise control over the practice of employed physicians, exercising 
too much control over members of the medical staff can place the hospital at risk of 
liability. 102 Thus, the general law behind classifying admitting physicians as independent 
contractors under federal labor and employment law is instructive. 
III. GENERAL LAW ON CLASSIFYING PHYSICIANS AS 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 
A. Worker Classification Under Title VII 
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."103 The statute defines 
"employee" as "an individual employed by an employer"104 but does not clearly define 
"employer."105 Given the circularity of this definition, the legislative history ofTitle VII 
is instructive to the worker classification of admitting physicians. 
B. Legislative History of Worker Classification Under Title VII 
The legislative history of Title VII suggests Congress permitted the classification of 
some physicians as employees. 106 As part of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress 
considered, but did not include, a proposal to exclude physicians employed by public 
or private hospitals from Title VII. 107 During Senate debate, Senator Harrison Williams 
(D-NJ) warned that "[this amendment] would take from a doctor the protection that the 
Constitution gives him and would protect through [Title VII]."108 Moreover, Senator 
Jacob Javits (R-NY) explained: 
[T]his amendment would go back beyond decades of struggle and of injustice 
and reinstate the possibility of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, color, 
sex, religion-just confined to physicians or surgeons, one of the highest rungs 
101 See Starr, supra note 5, at 385 the pressure to control health caie costs); see also 
INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HuMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (2000), tlttt1s:/,IW\vwnat1,ecllll 
102 See Cmty for Creative Non-Violence 
factor in the common-law agency test for 
contractors), 
103 42 lJ.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2018). 
104 42 US,C § (2018), 
105 42 US,C § a person 
fifteen or more 
\ u~'"'w"'!S how;,~···"',,;,, 
the control 
man commerce who has 
106 See v: New Haven Assocs,, 794 F2d 793, 800 CiL 1986); see also Lucido 
v, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 E Supp, 123, 126 (SD.NY 1977); see also EEOC v: Rinella & 
Rinella, 401 F Supp, 175, 179 (NH llL 1975), 
107 See Rinella &Rinella, 401 F Supp, at 179-80 
108 See id 
14 
118 Cong, Rec, 1647 (1972)), 
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of the ladder that any member of a minority could attain-and thus lock in and 
fortify the idea that being a doctor or surgeon is just too good for members of a 
minority, and that they have to be subject to discrimination in respect of it, and 
the Federal law will not protect them. 109 
The proposed exclusion of physicians from the protections of Title VII was ultimately 
defeated, allowing for the classification of some physicians as employees for purposes 
of Title VII. 11 o 
C. Case Law on Worker Classification for Purposes of Title VII 
The uncertainty surrounding worker classification under Title VII charges the courts with 
making this determination. Courts have employed three different tests for distinguishing 
between employees and independent contractors: (1) the common-law agency test, (2) 
the economic realities test, and (3) a hybrid test that combines elements of both the 
common-law agency test and the economic realities test. 111 In the medical context, most 
courts have found that admitting physicians are independent contractors who are not 
covered by Title VII, but some courts have concluded that physicians may be employees 
by relying on the common-law agency test. 
a. Legal Tests for Distinguishing Employees from Independent Contractors 
Prior to 1947, courts distinguished an employee from an independent contractor using 
the common-law agency test. 112 This test focused on the degree of control the employer 
exercised over the individual's work performance. 113 If the employer controlled not only 
"what work should be done, but also how it should be done," the worker was deemed 
an employee. 114 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, which involved the 
worker classification of an artist, the Supreme Court noted that an important factor is 
the employer's right to control the "manner and means" of the worker's performance. 115 
Other factors include the skill required, the source of the instrumentalities and tools, the 
location of the work, the duration of the parties' relationship, the employer's provision 
of employee benefits, the tax treatment of the worker, among others. 116 
In 1947, the Supreme Court held that the common-law agency test was too narrow 
for determining worker classification for purposes of social legislation. 117 The Court 
109 Id. 
110 Id 
111 See Patricia Davidson, The Under Title VII: 
1na,?pe,rzaem Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L REv. 203, 225 (1984). 
112 See United States v. Silk, 331 US. 704, 713 (1947). 
113 Id 
114 See EEOC v. Co., 713 F2d 32, 36 Cir. 1983). 
115 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 US. 730, 751 (1989). 
Between 
116 See id, see also Restatement of the Law, Agency,§ 220 factors to be considered in 
or an mGep(;naent contractor when~"~+~~·~;~ 
services for another person or 
117 SeeBartelsv. 332U.S.126, 130(1947) 
associated with the employer--erntplo1yee rel:1trn•nsl11p, 
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then proposed the "economic realities" test, which focuses on whether the individual 
is, as a matter of economic reality, dependent upon the business to which she renders 
her service. 118 In applying this test, courts examine the degree of control exercised by 
the employer, the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the employer, 
the degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the 
employer, the skill and initiative required in performing the job, and the permanency of 
the relationship. 119 
Notably, the courts have refrained from using the economic realities test for purposes of 
Title VII. Instead, courts traditionally use the economic realities test only for determining 
worker status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 120 Unlike Title VII, the 
legislative history of the FLSA suggests that the term "employee" be given "the broadest 
definition that has ever been included in any one act."121 Some courts have applied 
a hybrid of the common-law agency test and the economic realities test to determine 
worker status under Title VII, through which the worker's economic dependence on 
the employer is considered under the common-law principles of agency. 122 Applying 
the economic realities test, courts have noted that the extent of the employer's right to 
control the worker's performance is determinative. 123 In Spirides v. Reinhardt, in which 
the worker classification of a foreign language broadcaster was considered, the court 
held that necessary factors that apply to the consideration of worker status under the 
hybrid test include whether the work performed is under the direction of a supervisor, 
the skill required for the job, whether the employer furnishes the equipment used and the 
place of work, and the length of time during which the individual has worked. 124 
b. Case Law on the Worker Classification of Physicians for Purposes of Title VII 
Until the mid- l 990s, courts applied the hybrid test, concluding that admitting 
physicians at hospitals were independent contractors for purposes of Title VII. 
In Beverly v. Douglas, where an action against a hospital for denying a physician 
admitting privileges transpired, the court applied the hybrid test and found that the 
physician was an independent contractor since the hospital did not exercise control 
over the manner and means of the physician's performance. 125 The court noted that 
are upon the business to which 
119 See v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F3d 338, 343 Cir. 2008). 
120 See Cobb v. Sllil Papers, lnc., 673 F2d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1982). 
that "there is no statement in the [Civil Act or Je1n1sla1t1ve 
VU to one made Senator Hugo Black Justice Black), 
Fair Labor Standards Act, that the lerm in the FLSA was 
that has ever been included in any one act"'). 
122 Id 
123 See v. Reinhardt, 613 F2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
124 See id at 832. 
125 591 F Supp. 
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the physician had a practice outside the hospital, was not paid a salary, received no 
benefits, and had no office space. 126 Later cases emphasized that, in addition to these 
factors, the hospital did not supervise the physician's work and did not control the 
details of the physician's practice. 127 
The few cases during this time where the court found that physicians were employees 
for purposes of Title VII identified the ways that the hospital exerted control over the 
physician. For example, in Mitchell v. Frank Memorial Hospital, where an action was 
brought against a hospital for wrongful termination, the court found that the physician 
could bring a Title VII action because the hospital controlled the physician's practice. 128 
Moreover, in Ross v. William Beaumont Hospital, where a physician brought a sex 
discrimination action against a hospital, the court found that the physician was an 
employee because she underwent extensive progressive discipline, including probation 
and leaves of absence. 129 Finally, in Mallare v. St. Lukes Hospital, where an action 
against a hospital was brought for denying a physician admitting privileges, the court 
noted that the hospital exercised control over the physician's practice by retaining the 
right to withdraw medical staff privileges if his performance did not comport with 
hospital standards. 130 
Since the mid- l 990s, the courts have relied on the common-law agency test and generally 
classified physicians as independent contractors for purposes of Title VII. The initial 
switch was guided by the Supreme Court's use of this test in the context of the Copyright 
Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 131 The use of this test was 
over the physician's work). 
126 See id (noting that the physician is an independent contractor in part because staff physicians 
have practices outside the hospital and staff physicians are not paid a salary). 
127 See Diggs v. Harris Hosp. Methodist, lnc., 847 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying the 
hybrid test and finding the physician to be an independent contractor because the hospital did not 
direct the manner or means by which the physician rendered medical care and the hospital did 
not pay salary or licensing fees nor provided benefits); see also Amro v. St Luke's Hospital, 39 
FE.P 1574, 1576 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (maintaining the hybrid test and finding the physician to be an 
independent contractor because the hospital did not supervise the physician's work). 
128 See Mitchell v. Frank H. Mem'l Hosp., 853 F2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. l 988) (reiterating the hybrid 
test and finding the physician to be an employee in part because the hospital controlled the means 
and manner of his performance). 
129 See Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678 F Supp. 655, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (assessing 
the economic realities test and finding physician to be an employee in part because the physician 
underwent extensive progressive discipline, such as probation and leaves of absence and the 
physician "based her whole livelihood" on the hospital). 
130 See Mallare v. St Luke's Hosp., 699 F Supp. 1127, 1130 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying hybrid 
test and finding that material issues of fact existed as to whether a hospital was the employer of a 
physician because "the ultimate question was control of the means and manner of job performance," 
noting that the hospital exercised control in the sense that staff privileges could be withdrawn if a 
doctor's perfmmance did not comport with hospital's standards and denial of staff privileges would 
severely limit his opportunity to develop a full practice). 
131 See Nationwide Mut Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 US. 318, 322-23 (1992) (following Reid and 
adopting the common-law agency test for determining who is an employee for purposes ofERISA); 
see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 US. 730, 739-40 (1989) (holding that 
when Congress uses the term "employee" without defining it in the context of the Copyright Act, 
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solidified when the Supreme Court adopted this test for purposes of anti-discrimination 
laws. 132 In determining whether the hospital exercised control over the physician's 
performance, the courts highlighted the physician's ability to provide services according 
to her medical judgement and determine her working hours, who to work for, and which 
patients to treat. 133 These cases rejected the idea that hospitals exercised control by 
imposing on-call requirements and hospital standards on physicians. 134 
In 2008, the Second Circuit challenged the traditional classification of admitting 
physicians as independent contractors for purposes ofTitle VII. 135 In Salamon, the court 
examined what it means for a hospital to exercise control over the "manner and means" of 
a physician's performance in light of the nature of the physician-hospital relationship. 136 
The court focused on the means explored in Mitchell, Ross, and Mallare; namely, the 
scope of hospital standards and policies, active supervision, and corrective action. 137 
These means had been rejected by sister circuits. 138 
Congress intended to describe the conventional "master-servant" relationship as understood by the 
common-law agency doctrine). 
132 See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., PC. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442-44 (2003) 
(delineating Reid/Darden and adopting the common-law agency test for determining who is an 
employee for purposes of anti-discrimination laws, stressing that "the common-law element of 
control is the principal guidepost that should be followed."). 
133 See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the physician 
was an independent contractor since the hospital could not interfere with the physician's medical 
discretion or control the manner and means of his performance as a surgeon); see also Vakharia v. 
Swedish Covenant Hospital, 190 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the common law agency 
test and concluding the physician was an independent contractor since the physician provided 
services according to her professional judgement); see also Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Serv., 
115 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the common-law agency test and finding that the 
physician was an independent contractor since the physician exercised independence in determining 
his hours, income, and who he worked for); see also Alexander v. Rush North Shore Med., 101 F.3d 
487, 493 (7th Cir. 1996) (invoking the common-law agency test and concluding that the physician 
was an independent contractor because the physician had authority to exercise his independent 
discretion over his patients care). 
134 See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999) (referring to the 
common-law agency test and finding the physician to be an independent contractor, while rejecting 
the idea that being subject to hospital rules and standards made the physician an employee); see also 
Alexander, 101 F.3d at 490 (rejecting the argument that the on-call requirement made the physician 
an employee because "the details concerning performance remained within his control"). 
135 See Salamon v. Our Lady ofVictory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2008). 
136 See id. at 228. 
137 See Mitchell v. Frank H. Mem'l Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the 
hospital controlled the means and manner of physician's performance); see also Ross v. William 
Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 655, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (describing that the physician underwent 
extensive progressive discipline); see also Mallare v. St. Luke's Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (explaining that the hospital could withdraw staff privileges if physician did not 
comply with rules). 
138 See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with the idea that 
being subject to hospital rules and standards made the physician an employee); see also Vakharia v. 
Swedish Covenant Hospital, 190 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1999) (rebuffing the idea that suspension 
of staff privileges is indicative of hospital control); see also Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 
192 F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999) (objecting to the idea that subjecting physicians to hospital 
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IV. SALAMON AND HOSPITAL CONTROL OVER THE PRACTICES OF 
ADMITTING PHYSICIANS 
Dr. Barbara Salamon practiced at Our Lady of Victory Hospital (OLV) as a member 
of its medical staff. 139 Dr. Salamon filed a lawsuit against OLV claiming violations of 
Title VII. She alleged that Dr. Michael Moore, Chief of the Gastroenterology Division, 
sexually harassed her by making inappropriate comments and sexual advances toward 
her on multiple occasions. 140 Dr. Salamon claimed that Dr. Moore retaliated by using 
his administrative authority to give her negative performance reviews and subject her 
practice to excessive scrutiny when she complained about his behavior. 141 The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of OLV, finding that Dr. Salamon was not an 
employee under Title VII. The Second Circuit reversed and held that a question of fact 
existed as to whether Dr. Salamon was an employee. 142 The parties reached a settlement 
before Dr. Salamon's worker classification could be decided on trial. 143 
A. Salamon's Relationship with OLV 
As a member of OLV's medical staff, Dr. Salamon received clinical privileges and was 
subject to the same duty as staff physicians. Her clinical privileges included the use of 
hospital facilities and access to OLV's nursing and support staff. 144 Dr. Salamon set her 
own hours and determined which patients to see and whether to admit them to OLV or 
a different hospital. 145 However, OLV did not provide Dr. Salamon's salary, benefits, 
or any other compensation. 146 As a member of OLV's medical staff, Dr. Salamon was 
required to adhere to medical staff rules and by-laws, participate in staff meetings, and 
cover the Emergency Department. 147 OLV also required Dr. Salamon's participation 
in the hospital's Quality Assurance Program (QAP), which required practitioners to 
examine the procedures that the hospital used during the quarter. 148 
rules and standards made nh'v<11·.1~ 11< c1,1wmvcc;, see also Alexander v. Rush North Shore Med., ]() 1 
F3d 487, 490 
employee). 
made the physician an 
139 See Salamon v. Our 
140 Id at 220 
141 Id 
Hosp., 514 F3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2008). 
142 See id at 233 (discussing that there was a factual issue Dr. Salamon's status as an 
due to the level of control that the exercised over her medical and the 
methods of her work 
action prcJce1jur<es). 
standards and policies, active 
,,,, 1pw,aucm and Order of Dismissal, Salamon v. Our 
Cir. 2008), (No. 1:99-cv-00048). 
144 See Salamon, 514 F3d at 222. 
Hosp., 514 F3d 217 
145 See Salamon v. Our ofVictory Hosp., 514 F3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2008). 
146 Id 
147 Id 
148 See id at 222-23 1 ""P"'"'"'g that cases 
>H'-''-''"')';O, and the attending nm'o""'ViTI 
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B. The Alleged Harassment, Retaliation, and Increased Scrutiny 
Dr. Salamon alleged that when she complained about Dr. Moore's conduct to hospital 
administrators, they told her that her complaints were unfounded. 149 The administrators 
informed Dr. Salamon that several ofher cases would be reviewed for quality concerns. 150 
Dr. Salamon claimed that her practice was subjected to additional levels of review, 
and that increased scrutiny resulted in Dr. Salamon participating in a reeducation and 
mentoring program. 151 
C. The Hospital's Control of the Manner and Means of the 
Physician's Performance 
Judge Nancy Gertner, sitting by designation and writing for the Second Circuit, relied 
on Reid's framework in analyzing the law governing the worker classification of Dr. 
Salamon. 152 The district court found that the first Reid factor, which focuses on the level 
of control over the manner and means of a worker's performance, weighed against Dr. 
Salamon since she exercised her professional judgment with regard to patient diagnosis 
and treatment. 153 Judge Gertner found sufficient evidence to raise an issue about whether 
the hospital controlled the manner and means by which Dr. Salamon delivered her 
services. 154 Unlike the district court, Judge Gertner focused not only on Dr. Salamon's 
judgment regarding diagnosis and treatment, but also on the level of control the hospital 
exercised through quality standards, supervision, and corrective action. 155 
a. Scope of Quality Control Procedures and Policies 
Judge Gertner found that OLV exercised significant control over Dr. Salamon's practice 
through the application of its quality management standards, which mandated certain 
procedures, indicated the timing of other procedures, and dictated which medications to 
prescribe. 156 Judge Gertnerreasoned thatthe policies were not quality assurance standards 
required by health and safety concerns or for ensuring Dr. Salamon's qualifications, 
but rather designed to dictate details of Dr. Salamon's practice. 157 Furthermore, Judge 
Gertner noted that the purpose of these requirements was to maximize OLV's revenue. 158 
149 ld 224. 
150 ld 
151 SeeSalamonv.Om Hosp.,514F3d217,224-25 
the additional review included a review a nv1>pJtlys1c1<m 
outside expert). 
152 Id at 226. 
153 Id at227. 
154 Id 228-29. 
lss Id 
156 Id at 229. 
157 See Salamon v. Om 
158 Id 
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b. Supervision of Physicians with Admitting Privileges 
Judge Gertner found that OLV exercised significant control over Dr. Salamon's practice 
through active supervision. According to Dr. Salamon, excessive scrutiny began when 
she declined Dr. Moore's advances. 159 Judge Gertner found that OLV's supervision was 
not merely the result of negative medical outcomes but for variations from recommended 
procedures. 160 Dr. Salamon contented that OLV's strict standards resulted in nearly 
every one of her cases being scrutinized. 161 
c. Methods for Addressing Admitting Physician Performance 
Finally, Judge Gertner found that OLV exercised significant control over Dr. Salamon's 
practice by subjecting her to a reeducation and mentoring program. Rather than terminate 
Dr. Salamon's contract, the hospital required her to attend a reeducation program, which 
was designed to change the method by which Dr. Salamon carried out her practice. 162 
Judge Gertner emphasized that OLV exerted control over the manner and means of Dr. 
Salamon's practice by dictating the appropriate treatment for certain conditions and the 
length of some medical procedures. 163 
V. REASSESSING THE ADMITTING PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL 
RELATIONSHIP AFTER SALAMON 
A. The Difficulty in Applying the Common-Law Agency Test in the 
Medical Context 
a. Recognizing the Types of Control Inherent in the Physician-Hospital Relationship 
The difficulty of applying the common-law agency test in the medical context rests on 
the nature of the physician-hospital relationship. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) recognized, "the ultimate control of doctors performing 
work at hospitals results from a competition for control that is inherent in the duty of 
each to discharge properly its professional responsibility."164 Although a physician must 
have direct control to make decisions regarding medical care, the hospital must exert 
conflicting control over the physician's work to discharge its professional responsibility 
to patients regarding patient safety and quality of care. 
159 Id. at 223. 
160 Id. at 231. 
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b. Failure to Consider the Control Hospitals Can Exert Over Admitting Physicians 
The tension in professional control between physicians and hospitals over the discharge 
of medical services has deterred courts from considering control factors indicative of 
whether the admitting physician is an employee or an independent contractor. Notably, 
some courts have concluded that admitting physicians are independent contractors 
largely due to the assumption that hospitals cannot control a physician's practice. 165 
Courts have concluded that hospitals are prohibited from interfering with a physician's 
obligation to exercise her professional judgment in treating patients. 166 
In several cases, courts found the control factor in the common-law agency test to weigh 
in favor of hospital defendants by emphasizing that the physician provided medical 
services according to her professional judgment. In Shah v. Deaconess Hospital, which 
involved the revocation of a physician's surgical privileges, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) found that the physician was an independent 
contractor since the hospital did not have the right to interfere with the physician's 
medical discretion. 167 Similarly, in Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, where a 
physician brought an action for wrongful termination, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit) applied the common law agency test and found 
that the physician was an independent contractor because the physician followed her 
professional judgment.168 By overemphasizing the role of a physician's professional 
judgment, the courts did not consider the possibility that the hospital could be exerting 
control over the physicians' practices even if the physicians had discretion in treating 
their patients. 
Additionally, the courts have dismissed physicians' allegations regarding the extent 
to which hospitals exercise control over their practices by emphasizing the role of the 
physicians' professional judgment in treating patients. For example, in Alexander v. 
North Shore Medical, which involved the revocation of hospital privileges, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the argument that the hospital exerted control over the physician through 
its on-call requirement because "the details concerning performance of the work 
remained essentially within [the physician's] control."169 Furthermore, in Diggs v. Harris 
Methodist Hospital, which also concerned the revocation ofhospital privileges, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) rejected the argument that the 
hospital exercised control through active supervision during surgical procedures since 
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the hospital did not control the manner and means by which the physician performed the 
surgical procedure. 170 Although not addressed by the courts, hospitals may exert control 
over physicians' practices even if the physicians exercised professional discretion. 
Physicians have a responsibility to submit themselves to hospital standards and policies 
in order for the hospitals to exercise its professional responsibility to maintain standards 
of care. In Wojewski v. Rapid City Regional Hospital, which involved the revocation of 
hospital privileges due to a physician's manic episode, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eight Circuit (Eight Circuit) noted that "[the hospital] could take reasonable steps 
to ensure patient safety and avoid professional liability while not attempting to control 
the manner in which [the doctor] performed operations."171 Accordingly, in Cilecek v. 
!nova Health System Services, where a physician brought an action against a hospital 
for wrongful termination, the Fourth Circuit noted that the physician was responsible 
for cooperating with the hospital in maintaining standards of patient care. 172 In both 
instances, the court found that the physicians were independent contractors without any 
inquiry as to the level of control the hospitals exercised through such hospital standards. 
B.Approaches to the Common-Law Agency Test in the Medical Context 
Given the difficulty in applying the common-law agency test in the medical context, 
courts have adopted different approaches for analyzing the extent to which a hospital 
exercises control over the manner and means of a physician's performance. In Cilecek, 
the Fourth Circuit proposed instead of focusing on the level of control that hospitals 
exercise over the discharge of professional services, courts should focus on the level 
of control the hospital exercises over administrative details incident to the services. 173 
Despite the endorsement of the Fourth Circuit's approach by the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuit, the Second Circuit rejected the approach in Salamon. In doing so, the court 
emphasized that the issue of control over a physician's performance should focus on the 
hospital's control over the "details and methods" of the work, which may be influenced 
by hospital standards and policies, supervision, and corrective action. 
a. Fourth Circuit's Emphasis on Administrative Details Incident to 
Professional Services 
In Cilecek, the admitting physician argued that the hospital where he practiced exercised 
control over the manner and means of his practice through its medical staff bylaws, 
which provided a mechanism for peer review and corrective action for physicians whose 
practices did not meet hospital rules and regulations. 174 The Fourth Circuit recognized 
that the physician was required to abide by hospital rules and regulations for the 
that, 
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treatment of patients, which regulated his work in substantial detail. 175 These rules and 
regulations governed "every aspect of patient care," including medical histories, physical 
exams, tests and procedures, pre-requisites and post-requisites to surgical procedures, 
administration of medications, among others. 176 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found 
that the hospital did not exert control through these rules and regulations since they 
relate to the standards of care that the hospital and physician must maintain. 177 
Due to this dual responsibility, the Fourth Circuit found that focusing on the level of 
control exercised over the discharge of professional services is less useful in the medical 
context as it may be in other employer-worker relationships. 178 The court emphasized 
that the type of control exerted should be viewed in the context of the work itself and 
the applicable industry. 179 In the medical context, the Fourth Circuit focused on whether 
the hospital controlled the physician when he performed his services and the number 
of hours the physician performed services, as well as administrative details incident 
to the services. 180 The court found the physician was an independent contractor since 
he determined his hours, income, and which hospital he worked for. 181 Applying these 
principles, both the Sixth and Eighth Circuit have found admitting physicians to be 
independent contractors under Title VII. 182 
b. Second Circuits Emphasis on the Details and Methods of a 
Physicians Performance 
To date, the Second Circuit has been the only Court of Appeals to challenge the Fourth 
Circuit's approach in Cilecek. In Salamon, the Second Circuit acknowledged the dual 
responsibility that admitting physicians and hospitals have over the discharge of medical 
services. 183 However, the court warned that by overemphasizing the role of professional 
judgment and minimizing the control factor as the Fourth Circuit did in Cilecek, 
all physicians would be carved out from the protections of the anti-discrimination 
statutes. 184 Instead, the courts should focus on the control the hospital exercises over the 
details and methods of a physician's work. 185 
In this case, the Second Circuit focused on the level of control that the hospital exerted 
on admitting physicians through hospital standards and policies, supervision, and 
corrective action. While the court acknowledged that hospital standards and policies 
adopted pursuant to professional and governmental standards generally do not create an 
175 See id at 26L 
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employment relationship, the court noted that professional and governmental regulatory 
standards do not dictate the detailed treatment and peer review requirements that the 
hospital had implemented in this case. 186 These standards tend to concern health care 
administration, record keeping, financing, liability, patients' rights, and delegation of 
responsibilities. 187 Moreover, the court noted that there was evidence in this case that 
some of the hospital's actions were aimed at maximizing the hospital's revenue. 188 
c. The Benefits of Endorsing the Second Circuits Approach in Salamon 
The Fourth Circuit's approach to the common-law agency test focuses on the hospital's 
control over administrative details incident to the physician's practice. 189 This approach 
would effectively carve out all admitting physicians from the protections of Title VII 
and other anti-discrimination laws. 190 By overemphasizing the level of control hospitals 
exercise over a physician's services, the number ofhours worked, and the administrative 
details incident to the services, courts may find that admitting physicians are independent 
contractors. 191 Carving physicians out of these protections disregards congressional 
purpose to allow admitting physicians to be classified as hospital employees for purposes 
ofTitle VII. 192 
Focusing only on the administrative details incident to a physician's services, the Fourth 
Circuit's approach disregards the level of control that a hospital can exercise over the 
outcome of those services through non-administrative means. 193 As the Supreme Court 
noted in Reid, the proper focus of the control factor in the common-law agency test 
is on the level of control the employer exercises over the result accomplished and the 
manner and means by which the worker brings about that result. 194 There is nothing 
intrinsic to the physician-hospital relationship that prevents a court from assessing the 
186 See id. at 230. 
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level of control that a hospital exercises over the details of a physician's practice and the 
outcomes of her services through non-administrative means. 195 
By disregarding the level of control that a hospital can exercise over the treatment 
outcomes of a physician's services, the Fourth Circuit's approach ignores the way in 
which the physician-hospital relationship has evolved. 196 The Fourth Circuit's approach 
disregards the level of institutional control that hospitals have exerted on physicians 
through non-administrative means like mandated procedures, supervision, or corrective 
action. 197 Moreover, this approach is likely to prove increasingly unworkable. As 
hospitals continue to face pressure to influence physician behavior and experiment 
with physician employment, it is essential that hospitals define and differentiate the 
relationships maintained with employed physicians and admitting physicians. 198 
By contrast, the Second Circuit's approach considers both the level of control that 
the hospital exercises over the administrative details related to a physician's services, 
as well as the level of control over the discharge of such services. 199 Consistent with 
Reid, this approach focuses on the level of control the hospital exercises over both the 
treatment outcomes of a physician's practice and the details of her work.200 In doing 
so, the Second Circuit's approach allows some physicians to be classified as employees 
for purposes of Title VII, as intended by the statute.201 This approach recognizes the 
level of institutional control that hospitals have increasingly exerted over physicians 
over time. 202 As long as health care costs are primarily within the control of physicians, 
hospitals are incentivized to influence physician's actions to control health care costs.203 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Salamon is the most recent case to analyze the worker classification of admitting 
physicians for purposes of Title VII. The Second Circuit's decision in Salamon has 
elevated the fact-specific nature of the common-law agency test as applied in the 
medical context and redefined how courts assess the physician-hospital relationship. 
As hospitals continue to face pressure from third-party payers to control costs, it is 
incumbent on hospitals to define and differentiate the relationships maintained with 
employed physicians and admitting physicians. To minimize risk of liability, hospitals 
must ensure that the standards and policies, peer review programs, and corrective action 
procedures they impose on admitting physicians are aligned with government standards 
and not aimed at influencing physician behavior or maximizing revenue. 
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